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Abstract
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a function of  the 
political system and the public opinion of  the target country. In two experiments, we informed 
participants about a possible military intervention by the international community towards a sovereign 
country whose government planned to use military force against a secessionist region. They were then 
asked whether they would support this intervention whilst being reminded that it would cause civilian 
deaths. The democratic or nondemocratic political system of  the target country was experimentally 
manipulated, and the population support for its belligerent government policy was either assessed 
(Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiment 2). Results showed greater support for the intervention 
when the target country was nondemocratic, as compared to the democratic and the control conditions, 
but only when its population supported the belligerent government policy. Support for the external 
intervention was low when the target country was democratic, irrespective of  national public opinion. 
These findings provide support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis applied to international 
military interventions, and suggest that civilian deaths (collateral damage) are more acceptable when 
nondemocratic populations support their government’s belligerent policy.
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According to former United Nation Undersec-
retary-General Margaret Joan Anstee, United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan was 
met with fierce opposition when, in 1999, he sug-
gested that in certain cases UN “humanitarian 
intervention”—unsolicited armed intervention in a 
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sovereign country in order to protect its population 
(Sunga, 2006)—was justified (Anstee, 2000). The 
opposition came not only from developing coun-
tries, who feared a new form of  neo-colonialism, 
but also from developed countries, as exemplified 
by U.S. Senator Jesse Helms’ address to the UN 
Security Council: “ … a UN that seeks to impose 
its presumed authority on the American people, 
without their consent, begs for confrontation … 
and eventual American withdrawal” (Anstee, 2000, 
p. 1). To which, Brian Urquhart, also a former UN 
Undersecretary-General, commented: “He did not 
say whether this doctrine should apply to other 
sovereign countries—Iraq or Serbia, for example” 
(Anstee, 2000, p. 1). Thus, the debate around the 
legitimacy of  UN military interventions revolved 
around the question of  the type of  country in 
which such an intervention was deemed legitimate. 
Since then, the General Assembly of  the United 
Nations has approved a resolution laying out the 
basis for the right of  international forces to inter-
vene if  nations do not fulfill their “responsibility 
to protect their citizens” (ICISS, 2001; Warner 
& Giacca, 2009). However, several analysts have 
noted that it remains unclear when and how such 
interventions may be implemented (e.g., Hoge, 
2008), as pointed out for instance by the recent cri-
sis in Ivory Coasts (MacFarquhar, 2011). May this 
doctrine actually apply to some sovereign countries 
more than others?
While political, legal, economic, and military 
considerations are at the heart of  this problem 
(e.g. Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003; Welsh, 2004), 
social and psychological factors have been less 
taken into consideration despite the fact that they 
may influence the perceived legitimacy within the 
general public of  international interventions. 
Indeed, even if  not necessarily, humanitarian 
interventions frequently imply the use of  military 
force and often result in “collateral” civilian suf-
fering and death. On the one hand, support for 
international military interventions may intro-
duce a dilemma between the respect of  national 
sovereignty and the protection of  threatened 
national populations. On the other hand, support 
for such interventions may introduce another 
dilemma between saving lives and tolerating (or 
even condoning) the likely “collateral damage.”
Notwithstanding the complexity of  these situ-
ations, the present research aimed to investigate 
whether human lives in different conflict-ridden 
situations are perceived to have the same value or, 
in other words, whether all deaths are equally 
acceptable. In two experiments we tested the 
hypothesis that support for intervention of  inter-
national forces that would likely cause civilian 
deaths depends on two key features of  the target 
country: The nature of  the political system (dem-
ocratic or nondemocratic) and the support of  
public opinion (supporting or opposing its gov-
ernment’s policy).
Support for military 
intervention
Past research has examined support for military 
intervention as a function of  different individual- 
and group-level factors. Several studies have 
investigated individual differences in attitudes 
toward war as a function of  dispositional and 
ideological factors such as moral values (Aquino, 
Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2006; Cohrs, Moschner, 
Maes, & Kielmann, 2005), mortality salience 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2006), authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation (McFarland, 2005; 
Motyl, Hart, & Pyszczynski, 2009), as well as 
political attitudes (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; 
Herrmann, Tetlock, &Visser, 1999). Other stud-
ies have used cognitive factors such as need for 
closure (Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005) and prior 
knowledge (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002) to investi-
gate such attitudes. Group-level factors examin-
ing attitudes towards war include, for instance, 
national attachment, interests, and ethnocentrism 
(Federico et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 1999; Liu 
et al., 2009; Louis & Taylor, 2002; Pratto, 
Glasford, & Hegarty, 2006), collective perceived 
vulnerability (Elcheroth, 2006; Spini, Elcheroth, 
& Fasel, 2008), perceived adversary’s motivations 
and level of  force used (Herrmann et al., 1999; 
Healy, Hoffman, Beer, & Bourne, 2002; Mann & 
Gaertner, 1991), the relative power of  the countries 
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in conflict (Herrmann et al., 1999), and the exist-
ence of  explicit or implicit alliances (Healy et al., 
2002; Mann & Gaertner, 1991; Pratto, Glasford, 
& Hegarty, 2006).
However, only little research has experimen-
tally studied the effect of  the political characteris-
tics of  the countries involved in conflicts on 
attitudes towards military intervention (Healy 
et al., 2002; Herrmann et al., 1999; Mintz & Geva, 
1993). Overall these studies show that the politi-
cal system of  hostile countries shapes individuals’ 
perceived legitimacy of  the use of  military force 
by their own country. More specifically, these 
studies showed that participants support to a 
greater extent the use of  force by their govern-
ment in a hypothetical conflict when a fictional 
antagonistic country was described as nondemo-
cratic rather than democratic (Mintz & Geva, 
1993), and when the former victim of  the fic-
tional antagonistic country was democratic rather 
than nondemocratic (Herrmann et al., 1999; 
Experiment 2; see Healy et al., 2002, for alterna-
tive results in terms of  expectancy violations and 
individual differences).
Why do people perceive the use of  force as 
more appropriate when targeting a nondemo-
cratic rather than a democratic country? Explanations 
for these findings focus for example on the exist-
ing alliances between democratic countries (i.e., 
their common interest and fate) and on the lack 
of  incentives associated with the use of  force 
against a democratic country (Healy et al., 2002; 
Herrmann et al., 1999; Mintz & Geva, 1993; see 
also Pratto et al., 2006). Others have argued that 
justice judgments made by people from powerful 
countries with belligerent intentions are driven by 
ingroup favoritism (Liu et al., 2009). However, if  
only utilitarian motives would actually explain the 
observed effects, one should observe similar 
findings for the use of  force against both demo-
cratic and nondemocratic target countries, pro-
vided they are equally perceived as allies. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to disentangle the 
effects of  the political regime and the existence 
of  alliances given that in most of  these studies 
participants were citizens of  democratic countries 
(e.g., USA) and had to decide about the interven-
tion of  their own democratic government. 
Furthermore, research has also shown that 
nationals’ attitude towards their own country’s 
involvement in war is influenced by different jus-
tice concerns from those that shape attitudes of  
people in a targeted or noninvolved country (Liu 
et al., 2009).
In the present research we investigated an 
alternative explanation for the effect of  the politi-
cal system on support for military interventions 
that focuses on the general, not self-interested 
value attributed to democracy. We argue that 
beyond the existence of  common interests and 
common fate, democratic countries may be a less 
appropriate target of  international military inter-
ventions because democracy as such provides 
value and legitimacy to democratic governments 
and populations. Therefore, people may perceive 
them as less deserving of  the harmful conse-
quences of  war.
The democracy-as-value 
hypothesis
Notwithstanding the fact that international human-
itarian interventions such as those led by the UN 
may have “good” reasons to use military force 
against nations that do not protect their citizens, 
often they are also violent and harmful for the tar-
get population. However, as far as the target popu-
lation is concerned, several findings in the study of  
intergroup relations suggest that individuals are 
convinced that “good” people do not deserve bad 
treatment (Crandall & Beasley, 2001; see also 
Feather, 1999). Similarly, negative stereotypes of  
victim groups make hostile behavior towards them 
acceptable, for example in ethnic violence (Brewer, 
1999; Palmer, 1998; Petersen, 2002; Staub, 1989; 
Yzerbyt & Rogier, 2001). And prospects of  losing 
and saving lives reflect an implicit hierarchy of  
groups, where preserving the lives of  fellow 
national and ally soldiers is more important than 
preventing deaths among the enemy (Pratto et al., 
2006). Overall, these findings suggest that support 
for international interventions may be driven by 
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the individuals’ motivation to protect and enhance 
important values (see Rokeach, 1973; Schwarz, 
Struch, & Bilsky, 1990; Skitka, 2002; Tetlock, 1999), 
such as democracy.
According to the “Democracy-as-value” hypoth-
esis, originated in the work of  Falomir, Staerklé, 
Depuiset, and Butera (2005, 2007), democracy is 
an ideological belief  system that provides value to 
democratic individuals, groups, and institutions, 
and grants legitimacy to their actions, whatever 
their action may actually be, just like other ideolo-
gies do (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner, 1977; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Weber, 1958). The study 
of  democracy as a social and political value is 
therefore not the same as the study of  democracy 
as a government system. Furthermore, although 
the value attributed to democracy may be more 
likely to occur among citizens of  democratic 
countries, the spread of  democracy as a universal 
value suggests that it may not be restricted to 
them (e.g., Sen, 1999; Shapiro, 2003; Shapiro & 
Hacker-Cordon, 1999). Indeed, people infer spe-
cific characteristics of  a group and its members 
from the way the group functions; as a conse-
quence, people perceive that democratic groups, 
as compared to nondemocratic groups, are intrin-
sically good, and that actions emanating from 
them seem more legitimate (Staerklé, Clémence, 
& Doise, 1998).
On the one hand, democracy has seemingly 
become a nonnegotiable value in today’s world 
(Shapiro, 2003). At least in democratic countries—
even if  the recent events in the Arab world sug-
gest that the value of  democracy may not be 
restricted to them—people perceive democracy 
as the best possible political system (e.g., 
Magioglou, 2008; Staerklé, 2005). For one, people 
value democratic systems because procedural 
characteristics such as separation of  political and 
legal powers (e.g., Tyler & Mitchell, 1994) and 
decision-making procedures (i.e., the right to 
voice and to vote; see Folger, 1977; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975) make final decisions appear fairer 
and more legitimate than those obtained through 
nondemocratic procedures. In addition, a high 
moral value is associated with the abstract princi-
ples historically related to democracy, including 
human rights, peace, and prosperity (e.g., Cohrs, 
Maes, Moschner, & Kielman, 2007; Doise, Spini, 
& Clémence, 1999) as well as individual freedom, 
independence, and autonomy (e.g., Beauvois, 
2005; Sampson, 1988). Finally, people expect 
democracies to be inhabited by free, independ-
ent, and peaceful citizens, and ruled by a respon-
sive and responsible government. Such a stereotypical 
expectation is mirrored in perceptions of  non-
democratic countries in which people expect to 
see a submissive and dependent citizenry that 
easily yields to the demands of  a despotic, repres-
sive, and ruthless government (Staerklé et al., 
1998).
On the other hand, this high ideological value 
attributed to democracy leads to the perception 
of  both the government and the people living in 
democracy as being inherently good and there-
fore not deserving of  suffering (see Crandall & 
Beasley, 2001). In other words, people may per-
ceive harmful actions perpetrated against demo-
cratic groups, as compared to nondemocratic 
groups, as less legitimate. Indeed, prior experi-
mental research has shown that the democratic 
or nondemocratic structure of  groups in conflict 
predicted the perceived legitimacy of  aggressive 
intergroup behavior and collective punishments 
(i.e., the extent to which the whole group should 
be sanctioned in order to do justice; Falomir 
et al., 2005, 2007). More specifically, an aggres-
sion was perceived as the least illegitimate when 
it was perpetrated by a democratic group against 
a nondemocratic group (Falomir et al., 2005). 
Similarly, collective punishment against all mem-
bers of  a perpetrator group was perceived as the 
least legitimate when this group was democratic 
and the victim group was nondemocratic 
(Falomir et al., 2007).
To summarize, the democracy-as-value hypoth-
esis suggests that the political regime of  countries 
in conflict may also constitute a central contex-
tual factor in people’s support for military inter-
ventions. To keep this value-based hypothesis as 
free as possible from national allegiance, utilitar-
ian motives, and the perceived existence of  alli-
ances, we used rather uninvolved participants 
such as university students from a neutral country 
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that would not participate in the events we ask 
subjects to evaluate. Such a third party perspec-
tive constitutes an appropriate approach to exam-
ine the general, not self-interested value for 
democracy. Accordingly, the present research 
asked uninvolved participants to evaluate the 
legitimacy of  an international military interven-
tion against a (democratic versus nondemocratic) 
target country.
Target country’s public 
opinion toward belligerent 
government policies
Whereas the influence of  public opinion on gov-
ernments’ decision to militarily intervene has 
received careful attention (e.g., Maoz & Russett, 
1993; Reiter & Stam, 2002), no empirical research 
exists to our knowledge that addresses the influ-
ence of  the target country’s public opinion on 
observers’ support for external military interven-
tions. In order to fill this gap and provide a more 
direct test of  the democracy-as-value hypothesis, 
the present research investigated the effect of  the 
public opinion of  the target country in the exam-
ined processes.
First, we reasoned that whether or not a 
population supports its government’s aggres-
sive policies (e.g., the use of  disproportionate 
military force against a secessionist regional 
minority) may be used by observers as a cue to 
infer the perceived value of  the country’s pop-
ulation. As a consequence, if  observers focus 
on possible civilian deaths of  an external mili-
tary intervention, the extent to which the tar-
get population supports or opposes its government 
may influence observers’ support for such an 
intervention. More specifically, observers 
should support to a lesser extent such an 
intervention when the population opposes its 
government’s belligerent intent.
Second, according to democracy-as-value 
hypothesis, we reasoned that the effect of  the tar-
get country’s public opinion on support for exter-
nal military intervention should vary as a function 
of  the political structure of  the country. Past 
research has shown that people from Western 
societies perceive democratic countries to be 
committed to peaceful solutions and that when in 
conflict, war is their last resort (e.g., Cederman, 
2001; Healy et al., 2002; Reiter & Stam, 2002; 
Rummel, 1997); moreover, people perceive dem-
ocratic populations as less belligerent and violent 
than nondemocratic populations (e.g., Staerklé 
et al., 1998). Accordingly, whether a population 
supports or opposes its government’s belligerent 
actions constitutes an informative factor of  the 
democratic quality of  such a population, and 
hence its value. This understanding is of  particu-
lar relevance for the present research because it 
allows a test of  the democracy-as-value hypothe-
sis through a factor that is independent from the 
perceived similarities between the government 
regimes of  the target country and one’s own 
country.
Hence, a nondemocratic population that sup-
ports its government’s belligerent policies matches 
the stereotypical expectation of  a submissive 
population that easily yields to a nondemocratic 
government, and thereby intensifies the per-
ceived antagonism with democratic countries. If, 
on the contrary, the nondemocratic population 
opposes its government, it is no longer assimi-
lated with its belligerent intentions and with the 
government itself. The nondemocratic popula-
tion therefore shows a valued characteristic of  
democratic populations: Preference for peaceful 
solutions. Hence, international military interven-
tions explicitly causing civilian deaths within a 
nondemocratic target country should appear as 
less legitimate when its citizenry opposes its gov-
ernment, compared to when it supports it. For 
democratic countries, however, we do not expect 
such an effect of  public opinion, since according 
to the democracy-as-value hypothesis, demo-
cratic countries should be viewed as unaccepta-
ble targets of  external military interventions in 
any case.
Overview and hypothesis
In the present research we investigated perceivers’ 
support for an international military intervention 
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against a country whose government had belliger-
ent intentions towards a secessionist region. Due 
to the specific characteristics of  the scenario, we 
expected overall support for an external interven-
tion within a sovereign country to be low. 
However, according to the democracy-as-value 
hypothesis, our main hypothesis is that support 
for an international intervention against a non-
democratic country, as compared to a democratic 
country, should be higher when its population 
supports rather than opposes the belligerent poli-
cies of  its government.
This hypothesis was tested in two experiments 
in which we confronted participants with a sce-
nario that simulated a possible UN military inter-
vention in a fictitious sovereign country that 
would ostensibly cause civilian deaths. We used 
the UN as an agent of  the potential intervention 
in order to provide greater legitimacy to the 
intervention and to prevent participants from 
making specific inferences about the actual inter-
est of  an intervention perpetrated unilaterally or 
by specific multinational coalitions. We used a 
fictitious (but allegedly real) country newly cre-
ated after the break-up of  the former Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The reason 
for this choice was that during the last two dec-
ades the former Soviet Union has split in to many 
new countries and we assumed that the Swiss 
population in general would not have precise 
information about all their names and political 
regimes. Accordingly, this region was particularly 
appropriate to experimentally manipulate the 
political system of  the target country.
We informed the participants about an alleged 
conflict between two ex-Soviet states that gained 
political autonomy after the break-up of  the 
USSR. One of  these states, however, did not 
recognize the autonomy of  the other, which 
officially was a semi-autonomous region within 
that state, and planned to re-annex it by force. 
We manipulated the political system of  this 
country in both studies (democratic versus non-
democratic). Experiment 1 additionally intro-
duced a control condition without information 
on the political system. Public opinion toward 
the belligerent government policies was meas-
ured in Experiment 1, and experimentally 
manipulated in Experiment 2. Finally, partici-
pants were to indicate the extent of  their sup-
port for a UN military response taking into 
consideration that (a) the UN had no right of  
interference given that the situation occurred 
within the (contested) boundaries of  a sovereign 
country, and (b) such a response would likely 
result in civilian casualties.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and procedure The sample 
consisted of  55 participants (23 female and 32 
male), recruited on the campus of  a large Swiss 
University, with ages ranging from 17 to 36 (M = 
22.69, SD = 3.34). Most of  them were studying 
either economic and social sciences (60%) or 
political sciences (35%). We asked them to vol-
untarily participate in an opinion survey, and ran-
domly assigned them to one of  the three 
experimental conditions (political system of  the 
target country: democratic versus nondemo-
cratic versus control). At the end, the experi-
menter thanked the participants and provided 
careful debriefing.
Political system of  the target country The 
cover story informed participants that Abazie 
annexed the Bachran state during the Soviet 
period. After the collapse of  the USSR, Bachran 
asked for and obtained a de facto political auton-
omy, but Abazie and the international community 
did not recognize it. Recently, the Abazie govern-
ment announced that its goal was to get back the 
Bachran territory by force through military inter-
vention. Three pieces of  information concerning 
both government and population were provided 
and constituted the manipulation of  the political 
system of  the target country: Democratic [non-
democratic] countries were traditionally charac-
terized with egalitarian [hierarchical] family and 
community structures, as being democratic 
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[nondemocratic] before the Soviet period, and as 
having democratic elections [takeover] after the 
Soviet period. Information about the family and 
community structures was intended to manipu-
late the political system not only in regards to the 
government but also the population. The cover 
story described Abazie (the target country) as 
either democratic or nondemocratic. Bachran 
(the secessionist region) was always described as 
nondemocratic, given that previous findings 
showed that democratic aggressors are relatively 
more condoned when the victim is nondemo-
cratic (Falomir et al., 2007). The control condi-
tion did not provide information about the 
political systems. At the end of  the study, as a 
manipulation check, two questions asked partici-
pants to indicate to what extent the Abazie popu-
lation was (a) democratic and (b) egalitarian (from 
0 = not at all; 10 = absolutely), and were aggre-
gated into an average score (r = .48, p< .001; M = 
2.88, SD = 2.58).
Support for UN military intervention The 
experiment asked participants to imagine that 
Abazie attacked and took over Bachran by force, 
and that the Bachran secessionist government 
asked the international community for help. Par-
ticipants had to indicate to what extent they 
would support a UN military intervention despite 
the fact that the conflict took place within sover-
eign Abazie territory (i.e., without the right of  
interference). In order to focus participants on 
the harmful consequences for the population, 
they were reminded that a military intervention 
would cause massive civilian casualties among the 
Abazie population. Three questions assessed 
their support for the intervention on the basis of  
experts’ estimation of  number of  civilian casual-
ties among the Abazie population. Respondents 
had to indicate the extent to which they would 
support a UN military intervention against 
Abazie if  estimations involved (a) between 100 
and 500; (b) between 1,000 and 5,000, and (c) 
between 10,000 and 50,000 civilian casualties. 
Scales for the three items ranged from 0 (not at all) 
to 10 (absolutely). As expected, overall support 
for the international military intervention was 
low (M = 2.17, SD = 2.18; α = .83).1
Perceived public opinion toward belligerent 
government policies Participants had to indi-
cate the extent to which they considered that the 
population of  Abazie supported the attack on 
Bachran planned by its government (0 = not at 
all; 10 = absolutely; M = 6.11, SD = 2.71). Given 
that perceived public opinion was obviously 
measured after the description of  the conflict 
(and thus after the experimental manipulation), a 
precautionary analysis examined whether the 
manipulated political system of  Abazie influ-
enced perceived public opinion. The one-way 
ANOVA as a function of  the target country’s 
political system (democratic, nondemocratic, 
control) showed that perceived public opinion 
was independent of  the country’s political sys-
tem, F(2, 52) = 0.45, p = .63.
Results
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) suggestions 
for testing differences between experimental con-
ditions in a multiple regression analysis, we com-
puted two orthogonal contrasts. The first contrast 
compared the nondemocratic condition to the 
democratic and the control conditions, and the 
second contrast tested the residual by comparing 
these last two conditions (democratic versus con-
trol). The regression model included the two 
orthogonal contrasts, the standardized score for 
perceived public opinion, as well as the two inter-
action terms between public opinion and each 
contrast as predictor variables. Specific planned 
contrasts compared the relevant conditions with 
the control condition.2
Manipulation check The regression analysis on 
the perceived democratic nature of  the Abazie 
population, R2 = .23, F(5, 49) = 2.99, p = .019, 
showed a significant main effect of  the first con-
trast (β = .38), t(49) = 3.05, p = .004. Participants 
perceived the population as less democratic and 
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egalitarian in the nondemocratic condition (M = 
1.44, SD = 1.65) than in the control (M = 2.72, SD 
= 2.59) and democratic (M = 4.41, SD = 2.53) con-
ditions. The second contrast was also significant 
(β = .25), t(49) = 2.02, p = .048, indicating that par-
ticipants perceived the population as more demo-
cratic in the democratic than in the control 
condition. No other effects were significant, t(49) < 
.80. The manipulation of  the political system of  the 
country was therefore successful.
Support for UN military intervention The 
regression analysis, R2 = .35, F(5, 47) = 5.08, p = 
.001, revealed a significant effect of  the first con-
trast (β = -.43), t(47) = 3.70, p = .001; support for 
military intervention was higher in the nondemo-
cratic condition (M = 3.62, SD = 2.94) than in the 
democratic (M = 1.96, SD = 1.20) and control (M 
= 1.15, SD = 1.47) conditions. Perceived public 
opinion (β = .15), t(47) = 1.30, p = .20, the second 
contrast’s main effect (β = .14), t(47) = 1.18, p = 
.24, as well as their interaction (β = .10), t(47) = 
0.84, p = .40, were not significant.
As expected, the interaction between the first 
contrast and the perceived public opinion was 
significant (β = -.31), t(47) = 2.69, p = .01. 
Indeed, when participants perceived public opin-
ion as strongly supporting its government (+ 1 
SD), support for the intervention was higher in 
the nondemocratic condition than in the con-
trol, t(47) = 4.82, p< .001, and in the democratic 
conditions, t(47) = 3.14, p = .003. This effect 
disappeared when participants perceived the 
population as opposing its government (-1 SD), 
t(47) = 0.73, p = .47, t(47) = 0.58, p = .56, 
respectively. Finally, the effect of  perceived 
public opinion was significant in the nondemo-
cratic condition (β = .34), t(47) = 2.96, p = .005, 
but not in the democratic (β = .03), t(47) = 0.26, 
p = .79, and in the control (β = -.10), t(47) = 
0.89, p = .38, conditions. These findings are 
illustrated in Figure 1.
Discussion
This study confirmed our prediction. Support for 
international military intervention was overall low 
and remained low regardless of  perceived public 
opinion when the target country of  the interven-
tion was democratic. However, support for such 
intervention increased when a nondemocratic 
target population supported the belligerent poli-
cies of  its government. Given that in the present 
experiment we measured rather than manipulated 
perceived public opinion toward the aggressive 
government policies, a second study was carried 
out in order to confirm the causal role of  this 
factor.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants and procedure One hundred and 
twenty-two psychology students from a Swiss uni-
versity participated in this study (85% of  women; 
mean age 21 years; SD = 2.89). Unless otherwise 
indicated, procedure and material were similar to 
those used in Experiment 1. The experimental 
design randomly assigned participants to one of  
four experimental conditions, following a 2 (politi-
cal system of  the target country: Democratic ver-
sus nondemocratic) x 2 (public opinion: 
Opposition versus support). The main dependent 
variable was again the perceived legitimacy of  inter-
national military intervention (from 0 = not at all; 
10 = absolutely; α = .86; M = 1.50, SD = 2.11). We 
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Figure 1. Support (estimated mean) for UN military 
intervention as a function of  target country’s political 
system and perceived public opinion toward belligerent 
government policy (+/- 1 SD; Experiment 1)
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assessed the perception of  the population in terms 
of  its democratic and egalitarian structure as in 
Study 1 (r = .75; M = 2.78, SD = 2.72).
Public opinion toward belligerent govern-
ment policies. After learning about the con-
flict, participants read that opinion polls indicated 
that about 90% of  Abazia’s population was either 
in agreement (support condition) or in disagree-
ment (opposition condition) with the govern-
ment’s intention to re-annex the secessionist 
region by force. As a manipulation check, partici-
pants indicated at the end of  the study the extent 
to which they considered that Abazia’s popula-
tion supported the military intervention planned 
by their government (0 = not at all; 10 = abso-
lutely; M = 4.42, SD = 2.78).
Results
All analyses were run following a 2 (political sys-
tem: Democratic versus nondemocratic) x 2 
(public opinion: Opposition versus support) 
ANOVA.
Manipulation checks The analysis performed 
on the perceived democratic nature of  the popu-
lation showed a significant effect of  the political 
system, F(1, 114) = 34.27, p< .001, ηp2 = .23. Par-
ticipants perceived the population as more demo-
cratic and egalitarian in the democratic condition 
(M = 4.18, SD = 3.03) than in the nondemocratic 
condition (M = 1.56, SD = 1.64). The effect of  
the population’s attitude was marginally signifi-
cant, F(1, 114) = 3.41, p = .07, ηp2 = .02, but the 
interaction between the two experimental factors 
did not reach the conventional level of  signifi-
cance, F(1, 114) = 0.04, p = .83. Overall, partici-
pants perceived the population as more 
democratic when it rejected its government’s bel-
ligerent policy (M = 3.27, SD = 2.74) than when 
it supported it (M = 2.32, SD = 2.63), suggesting 
that they tend to associate democracy with more 
peaceful attitudes. Regarding perceived public 
opinion toward government policy, the analysis 
only showed a significant main effect of  the 
manipulated public opinion factor, F(1, 115) = 
19.74, p< .001, ηp2 = .14. Participants perceived 
the population as supporting the military policies 
of  its government more in the support condition 
(M = 5.43, SD = 2.59) than in the opposition 
condition (M = 3.33, SD = 2.59). No other effects 
were significant, Fs(1, 115) < 1.76, ps > .10.
Support for UN military intervention The 
ANOVA performed on the support for military 
intervention revealed that the two main effects 
were not significant, F(1, 118) < 1.58, p> .23. 
The predicted political system by public opinion 
interaction effect however was significant, F(1, 
118) = 4.25, p = .041, ηp2 = .035. This interac-
tion is illustrated in Figure 2. Simple effects tests 
showed that, as expected, the opposition (M = 
1.47, SD = 2.20) and support (M = 1.16, SD = 
2.16) conditions did not differ for the demo-
cratic country, t(118) = 0.55, p = .58. When the 
country was nondemocratic, however, the per-
ceived legitimacy of  intervention was higher 
when the population supported the belligerent 
policies of  its government (M = 2.24, SD = 
2.32) than when the population opposed it (M = 
0.98, SD = 1.49), t(118) = 2.42, p = .017. In the 
public opinion support condition, the support 
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Figure 2. Support for UN military intervention as 
a function of  target country’s political system and 
public opinion toward belligerent government policy 
(Experiment 2)
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for UN intervention was higher against a non-
democratic than against a democratic state, 
t(118) = 2.04, p = .043, but this difference was 
not significant in the public opinion opposition 
condition, t(118) = 0.88, p = .37.
Discussion
This second study provided further evidence for 
our hypothesis. Again, UN military intervention 
attracted low support overall, but this support var-
ied according to the country’s political system and 
the support provided by its public opinion. As 
predicted, one condition stood out: Compared to 
the other three conditions, international military 
intervention appeared less illegitimate when car-
ried out against a nondemocratic country in which 
public opinion supported the belligerent policy of  
its government. When the nondemocratic popula-
tion opposed this government policy, UN inter-
vention was as strongly rejected as the intervention 
against a democratic country. These results are 
thus consistent with those observed in the first 
experiment, but this time perceived public opinion 
was experimentally manipulated.
General discussion
Across the two studies we found that support for 
UN “humanitarian intervention” causing civil 
casualties was overall low, but varied, as predicted, 
as a function of  the political system of  the target 
country and of  public support for the target gov-
ernment’s belligerent policy. More specifically, 
participants considered international military 
intervention as less illegitimate when it was car-
ried out against a nondemocratic country, as 
compared to a democratic country, but only if  the 
nondemocratic population supported the bellig-
erent policies of  its government. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first research investigating the 
effect of  target country public opinion on 
observers’ support for an external military inter-
vention and thus contributes to our understand-
ing of  the perceived legitimacy of  international 
military conflicts on several accounts.
Overall these findings provide evidence for 
the democracy-as-value hypothesis. In the pre-
sent paradigm participants had to judge an inter-
national military intervention against a target 
country that was presumably existent, but actu-
ally unknown. As a consequence, participants’ 
judgments cannot be based on utilitarian motives 
related to perceived or existent alliances between 
their own country and the target country. These 
findings rather point out the intrinsic value 
attributed to democracy and democratic popula-
tions. The political system of  target countries 
constitutes a central element in legitimacy judg-
ments of  military interventions against this 
country’s belligerent intention, and the present 
research shows that these judgments also depend 
on considerations about the population’s atti-
tude towards its government.
We expected that individuals would be moti-
vated to protect populations from military harm, 
and participants overall rejected the external mili-
tary intervention. However, we predicted that this 
protection would be greater to the extent that 
participants consider the target population as 
“worthy,” depending upon two factors related to 
the target country: Namely its political system 
and its public opinion. In line with the democracy-
as-value hypothesis, support for an external inter-
vention was low when the target country was 
democratic, irrespective of  national public opin-
ion. This finding therefore suggests that under no 
circumstances did participants consider a demo-
cratic country to deserve the negative conse-
quences of  an external intervention.
International military intervention against non-
democratic countries, however, seemed to follow a 
more complex pattern. Indeed, whether respond-
ents spared nondemocratic countries a potentially 
harmful military intervention depended on the per-
ceived attitude of  its population. When the non-
democratic population supported the belligerent 
intention of  its own government, respondents 
seemed to deem this population as less worthy of  
protection and then rejected to a lower extent the 
military intervention causing civilian deaths. Much 
in line with old-fashioned colonialist representa-
tions of  a superior West (Said, 1978), research has 
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shown that nondemocratic populations are likely to 
appear as antagonistic to democratic populations in 
terms of  qualities deemed necessary for a demo-
cratic functioning of  society, for example inde-
pendence, individual autonomy, and rationality 
(Staerklé et al., 1998). Put otherwise, the perceived 
unity between a nondemocratic government and its 
population could make them more deserving of  
military intervention of  international community. 
In order to enter the “moral community” of  popu-
lations worthy of  protection, they need to prove 
that they have the same qualities as democratic 
populations. Our findings have shown that this was 
the case when nondemocratic populations opposed 
their government’s belligerent policy.
Limitations and future 
research
Despite the reliability and consistency across 
experiments of  the present findings, the present 
research suffered from some limitations. First, the 
fact that participants were university students 
from a democratic country prevents us from mak-
ing general claims about the perceived legitimacy 
of  UN interventions. However, it is worth noting 
that university students are potential future mem-
bers of  the political elite with a strong influence 
on political decisions; the use of  this sample is 
therefore less problematic than in other studies.
Second, and in line with social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), one could argue that the 
similarity of  the regime rather than the value of  
democracy may drive the present findings. Indeed, 
World War II constituted a turning point in the 
actual understanding of  democracy mainly in 
Western countries, and democracy could therefore 
be considered as a value restricted to Western 
democratic countries. However, there are reasons 
to consider democratic principles as universal val-
ues (e.g., Sen, 1999; Shapiro & Hacker-Cordon, 
1999). Indeed, more democratic forms of  govern-
ance have spread around the world (United 
Nations, 2002), and the recent events in the Arab 
world would suggest that restricting the value of  
democracy to actual democratic countries is not 
appropriate. Of  course, this does not mean that 
we should expect exactly the same effect in any 
country, given that specific cultural, social, and 
political contexts may reduce the perception of  
democracy as a value, and that democracy and 
democracy’s internal criticism may take on many 
different forms. But this exception does not mean 
that this hypothesis is merely a similarity issue that 
one should restrict to Western liberal democracies. 
Furthermore, the fact that support for interna-
tional military intervention also depends on that 
target country’s public opinion cannot be explained 
in terms of  regime similarities. Accordingly, the 
present findings would benefit from further 
research examining perceived legitimacy of  inter-
national military interventions across societies rep-
resenting different political regimes, economic and 
military power, and cultural history.
Third, the present research studied the moder-
ating role of  the process variable (see Jacoby & 
Sassenberg, 2011). We assumed that the value 
attributed to the democratic population would 
drive the effect of  the political system on the per-
ceived legitimacy of  an external international 
military intervention. Given that an important 
characteristic of  democratic populations is that 
they allegedly support peaceful solutions, our 
approach consisted in investigating the moderat-
ing role of  this feature, by measuring it and then 
experimentally manipulating it. However, future 
research is needed to confirm this hypothesis 
through additional moderation analyses, includ-
ing other features of  democratic populations 
such as individual freedom and political equality. 
Furthermore, our understanding of  the activated 
processes would also benefit from mediation 
analyses examining whether perceived character-
istics of  the population (e.g., as more or less dem-
ocratic and valued) or amoral disengagement 
processes (e.g., dehumanization of  the target 
population; see Bandura, 1999; Cohrs, Maes, 
Moschner, & Kielmann, 2003) mediate the sup-
port for external military interventions as a func-
tion of  the target country’s political system. 
Finally, another aspect that would benefit from 
further research regards the hypothesis that the 
conditional protection of  national populations 
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depends on participants’ motivation to protect 
and enhance the value of  democracy itself.
Fourth, another issue deserving further 
research concerns the lack of  differences between 
the democratic and control conditions in Experiment 
1, which may be perceived as inconsistent with 
the democracy-as-value hypothesis. Indeed, 
results showed that when the target country was 
democratic, support for an external intervention 
was not lower than in the control condition in 
which the political system was not specified. 
Since participants were overall strongly opposed 
to any external intervention within a sovereign 
country (see also Liu et al., 2009), a floor effect 
may have prevented such a difference from 
occurring. However, one could also argue that the 
lack of  differences between the democratic and 
control conditions would mean that participants 
assume that unfamiliar countries are more likely 
to be democratic rather than nondemocratic. 
Accordingly, future research should examine 
whether this effect constitutes a mere floor effect 
or reflects the overattribution of  democratic fea-
tures to unknown countries.
Finally, another issue deserving further inves-
tigation concerns the fact that the scenario used 
in both experiments sets a specific political con-
text. First, in order to simplify the experimental 
paradigm, we always presented the secessionist 
region as nondemocratic across conditions and 
experiments. We based this decision on prior 
research which showed that the effect of  the 
political structure of  an aggressor country appeared 
only when the victim was nondemocratic (Falomir 
et al., 2005, 2007). In the present context, how-
ever, we cannot be sure whether a democratic 
secessionist would have altered the dynamics of  
the perceived legitimacy of  an international mili-
tary intervention. Future research is therefore 
needed to examine our hypothesis in a paradigm 
overcoming this limitation.
A second defining feature of  our experimental 
context was that the cover story made explicit the 
risk of  civilian “collateral damage” in the target 
country. Military intervention necessarily entails 
civilian risks and the tolerance for such collateral 
damage may strongly vary as a function of  the 
perceived public opinion. Since our scenario 
highlighted civilian casualties, we assumed that 
participants’ support for military intervention 
would follow the protection of  the valued popu-
lation: Lower support when a “worthy” popula-
tion opposed its belligerent government than 
when a less “worthy” population supported its 
government. However, one could easily make the 
opposite claim if  the scenario does not highlight 
potential civilian casualties. In this case, the goal 
of  liberating a nondemocratic population that 
opposes its belligerent government policy should 
become even more salient than the likely “collat-
eral damage,” and the support for a external mili-
tary engagement should be higher. These 
alternative predictions constitute fruitful ground 
for future research and the development of  the 
democracy-as-value hypothesis.
A last feature of  the experimental scenario 
was the simplified descriptions of  democratic 
and nondemocratic political systems. We opera-
tionally defined democracy in a clear-cut way 
with overt election procedures as well as cultural 
underpinnings of  a democratic political system at 
the family and the community level. Certainly, 
democratic systems include a number of  addi-
tional parameters which give rise to different 
degrees and types of  democratic governance. We 
believe, however, that this simplification does not 
undermine our findings, and that the central 
story of  our results relates to the profound 
antagonism between democratic and nondemo-
cratic systems in the minds of  people living in 
Western societies. Even when descriptions of  
political systems are overly simplified, respond-
ents seem to have a fairly precise idea of  what the 
implications of  democracy are (Staerklé et al., 
1998). Our research is a step toward showing the 
extent to which Western citizens rely on this fun-
damental antagonism between democratic and 
nondemocratic political systems in order to make 
up their minds about international policy issues.
Concluding remarks
This paradigm may be of  particular relevance to 
the typical dilemma the UN face when considering 
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humanitarian interventions, as for instance in the 
Balkans war, in the conflicts between Georgia 
and North-Ossetia, in Sudan’s Darfour or in 
Libya. However, as noted above, which UN mili-
tary interventions are legitimate remains unclear 
(e.g., Hoge, 2008). On the one hand, the present 
findings might seem irrelevant concerning the 
debate about the legitimacy of  UN decisions and 
resolutions (e.g., Caron, 1993; Hurd, 2008; 
Popovski & Turner, 2008), given that the Security 
Council decisions on the use of  force are based 
on an international legal framework (see Cassesse, 
1999; Simma, 1999; the UN Charter; articles 39, 
41, & 42; Voeten, 2005; Weston, 1991; see also 
Malone & Khong, 2003). On the other hand, 
however, the present findings suggest that not-
withstanding its legal bases, the perceived public 
legitimacy of  UN interventions appears to be 
variable, at least among citizens of  Western 
countries, which is paradoxically understudied.
We opened this article with a question about 
whether UN military interventions may apply 
to some sovereign countries more than others. 
Unfortunately, our findings suggest that not all 
lives have the same value. At least in the eyes 
of  Western citizens, we found that lethal inter-
national military interventions were perceived 
as more legitimate when targeting nondemo-
cratic countries whose population supports 
their government’s belligerent intentions, as 
compared to those interventions in which the 
government or the population are on the mor-
ally “right side.” These findings provide con-
vergent support to the Democracy-as-value 
hypothesis, and suggest that the perceived 
legitimacy of  the use of  force by the interna-
tional community depends on the value attrib-
uted to the population that endures civilian 
casualties. These findings also suggest that 
international actors (e.g., governments and 
media) may discursively call upon the political 
structure of  potential target countries in order 
to justify their belligerent intentions, since 
nondemocratic populations would be consid-
ered as less worthy victims whose fate is more 
likely to be ignored or denied (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988).
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Notes
1 In both experiments, initial analyses using these 
three measures as a within-subjects factor revealed a 
significant main effect of  the within subjects factor: 
Experiment 1, F(1,47) = 50.96, p< .001, ηp2 = .52; 
Experiment 2, F(1,118) = 60.33,p< .001, ηp2 = .33. In 
both experiments, support for military intervention 
decreased as the number of  civilian casualties 
increased (Experiment 1: M = 3.54, M = 2.03, and M = 
0.94; Experiment 2: M = 2.54, M = 1.26, and M = 
0.71). Since none of  the interaction effects with this 
factor was significant (overall interaction effects: 
Experiment 1, F(1,47) < 0.14, p> .72, and Experiment 
2, F(1,118) = 2.17, p =.15), we simplified the reported 
results by computing a mean score of  support for 
military intervention.
2 In both experiments, participants strongly disa-
greed with the military intervention, which resulted in 
a floor effect and heterogeneity of  variances. Precau-
tionary analyses on transformed scores and excluding 
outliers confirmed the reliability of  the observed find-
ings; thus, we decided to present the analyses for the 
raw scores and the full sample. Across the two studies, 
differences in degrees of  freedom appear as a function 
of  missing values.
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